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Introduction by Brad Simpson, University of Connecticut 
ecent historiography on the Cold War in Southeast Asia resists easy categorization. ough scholars 
continue to produce sophisticated country-focused studies, and to take advantage of recent 
methodological turns to explore the environment, gender, migration, development, and the 
circulation of goods and culture, few historians have aimed for broad synthetic accounts that center politics 
and interstate diplomacy, as Ang Cheng Guan does in Southeast Asia’s Cold War: An Interpretive History. 
ere are some good reasons to resist this temptation, including the linguistic and archival challenges of 
researching across wildly diverse countries and continued disagreement over basic questions of periodization, 
perspective, and method. When did the Cold War ‘come’ to Southeast Asia? How can we tell an inside-out 
story which acknowledges the ways in which the Cold War shaped the choices of local actors while still 
focusing on their agency? How do we account for those dynamics—such as the challenges of postcolonial 
development—which intersected with but were not wholly determined by the Cold War? 
Ang Cheng Guan acknowledges these challenges, especially in the wake of the so-called cultural turn in 
Southeast Asian history, but insists that the method of international history, broadly construed, illuminates 
crucial features of the region’s imbrication in the wider global conﬂict between the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and China in the twentieth century. is wide-ranging narrative begins with the post 1919 formation 
of local Communist parties in Southeast Asia, then examines the galvanizing impact of the Chinese 
revolution, before turning to the institutionalization of the Cold War through summitry and regional 
organizations such as SEATO and the 1955 Bandung Conference. e next several chapters focus on the 
Sino-Soviet split and its regional consequences, the Vietnam War, and the ambiguous ‘end’ of the Cold War 
in the decade and a half after 1975. 
e reviews here mostly applaud the breadth of Ang Cheng Guan’s account, which, according to Michael J. 
Montesano, “poses a strong and fundamental challenge to easy acceptance of ‘the Cold War’ as a useful 
framework” for apprehending the history of the region. Jürgen Haacke likewise congratulates Ang for having 
written “a very readable and important book,” one which is “well-crafted and empirically rich” and marked by 
cross-regional coverage. Reviewers uniformly praise the breadth of Ang’s research, which brings to bear what 
Mattias Fibiger describes as “a vast array of sources, including archival documents from the United Kingdom, 
United States, and Australia; English-language print media from Southeast Asia and the wider world; 
autobiographies and memoirs of key personages; and the voluminous secondary literature.” ey also endorse 
his wide-ranging geographic approach, which deftly surveys political developments across the region over the 
course of decades in a relatively compact narrative. 
e novelty of synthetic works such as this rests on their ability to marshal familiar evidence in service of new 
arguments and interpretations, and on this task the reviewers are somewhat divided. ey agree with Ang’s 
decision, joining Odd Arne Westad and others, to seek the origins of the Southeast Asian Cold War in the 
mostly ineﬀective Communist Party activism in the interwar period.1 Despite the limited success of these 
eﬀorts, the Japanese conquest of the region beginning in 1941, the collapse of European colonial rule between 
1941 and 1945, and the Chinese Revolution galvanized Communist movements throughout the region. 
Reviewers appreciate Ang’s emphasis in telling this story on the agency of local Communist parties and 
movements in the 1940s, especially in the face of limited Soviet interest and Chinese weakness. After 1949, 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Odd Arne Westad. e Cold War: A World History (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 19-43. 
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however, Ang argues that the Chinese Revolution drove regional politics, as the two superpowers, anti-
Communist political elites, and local Communist parties were forced to grapple with Chairman Mao 
Zedong’s support for revolutionary movements in the region. While some endorse Ang’s analytic frame, 
Fibiger laments what he terms the “orthodoxy” of a focus on Communist organizing rather than the local 
conditions out of which it grew, resulting in “a call-and-response narrative in which Communists attempted 
to remake state and society and anticommunists responded.”  
Attempts at regional alliance building, or attempts to escape such pressures, as exempliﬁed by the 1955 Afro-
Asian Conference in Bandung, suggest some of the many ways that Cold War tensions inﬂected both the 
domestic politics and foreign relations of countries in the region, especially in the wake of the Sino-Soviet 
Split (chapters 4, 5). Reviewers largely agree with Ang’s focus here on what Montesano calls the “unending 
need of Southeast Asian states and societies to work out their relationships with China,” and the disruptive 
eﬀects this had on the internal politics of Southeast Asian states, where decisions to back the United States, 
the USSR, or China did not always break along predictable fault lines. 
e Vietnam War looms large in most histories of Southeast Asia’s Cold War, and these readers are generally 
relieved that Ang does not read Southeast Asian politics as a mere extension of the conﬂict in Indochina. As 
he notes, by 1966 anti-Communist regimes had consolidated control of the region outside of Vietnam, Laos, 
and Cambodia, in eﬀect exiting the Cold War system, though they continued to beneﬁt from U.S. security 
and credibility concerns to extract military and economic aid, even as they turned to the broader project of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regionalism. Kenton Clymer, like the other reviewers, 
particularly appreciates Ang’s focus on the so-called “third Indochina war,” the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia and subsequent Chinese attack on Vietnam, as the catalyst for the long, slow, and rather 
ambiguous winding down of institutionalized Cold War conﬂict in the region, which thirty years after its 
‘end’ still counts three nominally Communist states (Laos, Vietnam, and China). 
Ang’s focus on interstate diplomacy and politics, readers seem to agree, helps to clarify some of the key 
dynamics of geopolitical conﬂict, decolonization, and “nation-building.” But Fibiger laments that “processes 
like state-building, economic development, ideological polarization, and social militarization—all of which 
depended in no small measure on the intervention of the Cold War’s central protagonists—receive little 
attention” in Ang’s narrative. And Kenton Clymer suggests that the emphasis on state and party politics 
drains some of the human drama from Ang’s account, especially given the enormous human toll of Cold War 
conﬂict in Indonesia, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and elsewhere in the region. All agree that Ang might have 
explored more deeply the economic dimensions of local and regional politics, especially after 1975, when 
arguably ‘post-Cold War’ regional and developmental dynamics held greater sway, but in ways that were 
deeply aﬀected by the physical and political legacies of Cold War conﬂicts. 
Ang’s book adeptly surveys the complicated and intertwined dynamics of Southeast Asia’s postcolonial politics 
over the course of a half century of the Cold War. But the readers here agree that much work remains to be 
done, especially at the archival level, to more fully excavate local and regional dynamics that intersected with, 
but were not directly the product of the Cold War. 
Participants:  
Ang Cheng Guan is presently Associate Dean and Head of Graduate Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. His forthcoming book (in late-2019) 
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is entitled Southeast Asia after the Cold War: Order and Regionalism, which is the sequel to Southeast Asia's Cold 
War. He is presently working on a new book entitled SEATO: A History. 
Brad Simpson (Ph.D., Northwestern) is an Associate Professor of History at the University of Connecticut. 
He is the author of Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and US-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968 
(Stanford, 2008). He is currently writing a global history of the idea of self-determination in international 
politics. 
Kenton Clymer is Distinguished Research Professor in the History Department at Northern Illinois 
University. He graduated from Grinnell College, then completed his graduate work at the University of 
Michigan, where he was a student of Bradford Perkins. He is the author of several books relating U.S. 
relations with Southeast East Asia. His most recent book is A Delicate Relationship: e United States and 
Burma/Myanmar since 1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015). He is currently researching the career of 
the “Burma Surgeon,” Gordon Stiﬂer Seagrave. 
Mattias Fibiger is Assistant Professor in the Business, Government, and International Economy unit at 
Harvard Business School. He received his Ph.D. in 2018 from the Department of History at Cornell 
University in 2018. His dissertation examines the international and transnational construction of 
authoritarian rule in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore in the 1970s. 
Jürgen Haacke is Associate Professor in International Relations at the London School of Economics and 
Political Science (LSE). He teaches on the international politics of Southeast Asia, including the foreign and 
security policies of Southeast Asian countries, East Asian regionalism, and foreign policy analysis. He is the 
author of ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development, and Prospects. Among other topics, 
he has also published on Myanmar’s foreign policy, the responsibility to protect, and recognition-theoretic 
approaches within critical theory. His current research includes a focus on the role of policy entrepreneurs in 
the making of U.S. Burma policy.  
Michael Montesano coordinates the ailand and Myanmar Studies Programmes of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak 
Institute in Singapore, for which he has also served as managing editor of SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues 
in Southeast Asia since 2013. He is the co-editor of several books on ai history and politics and on 
contemporary Southeast Asia more broadly, including the forthcoming After the Coup: 22 May 2014 and the 
Future of ailand (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing 2018, co-edited with Terence Chong). His current research 
concerns relations between Bangkok and the ai provinces since the 1930s.  
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Review by Kenton Clymer, Northern Illinois University 
here are several important books about the history of Southeast Asia, beginning with D.G.E. Hall’s 
classic work, A History of South-East Asia, ﬁrst published in 1955.1 Works that focus on the Cold War 
period are scarcer, and those that exist are edited works with chapters by diﬀerent authors. Ang Cheng 
Guan mentions these in the ‘acknowledgments’ page of his book and comments generously on their 
importance. But there appear to be no single-authored works on the topic employing a regional perspective—
until now. us Southeast Asia’s Cold War: An Interpretive History, ﬁlls an important gap. It is similar to the 
very few surveys of U.S. policy toward the region as a whole, such as Robert J. McMahon’s essential work, e 
Limits of Empire: e United States and Southeast Asia since World War II.2 
In the introduction, the author surveys the various approaches to the discussion of international relations 
history, including the ‘cultural turn,’ the ‘new imperial history,’ ‘subaltern studies,’ and so forth. And while 
acknowledging the usefulness of these newer approaches, his book is an institutional and diplomatic history, 
an approach justiﬁed by the lack of book-length overviews of the region during the Cold War. More 
adventurous approaches will presumably build on this traditional account.  
Ang Cheng Guan appropriately begins the book with a lengthy (arguably a bit too lengthy) account of the 
‘antecedents’ to the Cold War that emerged in the interwar period. In this chapter he surveys the 
development of Communism and Communist parties in several of the Southeast Asian countries. He is 
particularly interested in discovering whether the Communist parties of Southeast Asia were inﬂuenced by the 
Soviet Union and/or the Chinese Communists or whether they emerged out of local situations that were 
largely uninﬂuenced by outside developments. Certainly there was some outside inﬂuence. Both Ho Chi 
Minh and Tan Malaka were Comintern representatives, for example. Yet even they were nationalists, 
responding to the desire for independence. Ang Cheng Guan appears, then, to take something of nuanced 
view of the question. At the end of the chapter he discusses the well-known Calcutta Conference of Youth 
and Students of Southeast Asia Fighting for Freedom and Independence, which met in February 1948 as the 
Cold War was beginning. Some have argued that the conference illustrated Soviet inﬂuence on the 
Communist movements in Southeast Asia, something evident in four Communist insurgencies that broke out 
in separate countries in the region soon after the conference. Others disagree. Ang Cheng Guan generally 
accepts the view that the insurgencies were “largely shaped by local developments not directed by the Soviet 
Union” (51), though he acknowledges a possible ideological attachment to the larger Communist movement.  
In any event, most of the Communist movements in the region had little success prior to World War II, in 
part due to serious repression by the colonial powers, and in part due to internal problems. More than 
anything else, it was World War II that “brought about the revival of the communist movements in Southeast 
Asia” (28), in part because, as followers of the “united front” approach that supported the Allies, the colonial 
powers often allowed them to function and even legalized them. 
                                                     
1 D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (4th ed.; London: Macmillan, 1981). 
2 Robert J. McMahon, e Limits of Empire: e United States and Southeast Asia since World War II (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1999). 
T 
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In the second chapter Ang Cheng Guan examines the importance of the victory of the Chinese Communists 
in 1949. In a country by country survey, he concludes that the Chinese were much more important than the 
Soviet Union in fueling the Cold War in Southeast Asia. (Interestingly the Philippines showed the least 
Chinese inﬂuence, even on the Communist-led Hukbalahap Rebellion, which the Americans helped 
suppress—though the Huks’ downfall, the author asserts, was due more to their own internal contradictions.) 
us the year 1949 was critical. Contributing to this was the strong American response to Chinese 
developments, which helped bring the Cold War to Southeast Asia. e ‘fall’ of China unquestionably had a 
traumatic eﬀect on the United States, which had always thought of itself as a friend of China and was now 
being attacked by the new Chinese government as the leading oppressor and imperialist power in the world. 
Still, fear of Communism and Communist expansion in the region was central to American policy well before 
1949.  
In the following chapter, “Geneva, Manila, and Bandung,” the author employs a diﬀerent approach. Instead 
of surveying each country in turn, he focuses attention on events: the Geneva Conference of 1954, the 
formation the same year of the Southeast Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Bandung Conference 
(1955). With respect to the Geneva Conference, among the author’s more important points is partially to 
dispute the common assertion that the Soviet Union and China forced the Vietnamese to accept an 
agreement that did not reﬂect their position on the battleﬁeld, which they deeply resented. is is, in fact, the 
Vietnamese view of what happened. e Chinese, however, have asserted that the Vietnamese had exhausted 
themselves in the decisive battle of Dienbienphu and were in no position to move further for the time being. 
ey were therefore not entirely disappointed with the settlement, which appeared to give them a chance to 
attain their goals peacefully in the coming years. Ang Cheng Guan sees “elements of truth” (71) in both 
accounts, but concludes that Ho Chi Minh himself was actually more aligned with the Chinese assessment of 
the situation than were some of the more exuberant Vietnamese. 
It is sometimes forgotten that Geneva also dealt with the situations in Laos and Cambodia. e ﬁrst question 
with respect to these countries was whether to include representatives from the revolutionary forces active in 
Laos and Cambodia (the “Issaraks”) at the conference, much as the Vietminh participated. In the end, they 
were not invited, a decision for which Ang Cheng Guan credits China. But in fact the Cambodians in 
particular fought mightily to exclude the Issaraks, and their tenaciousness deserves some credit. In the end, the 
Cambodian Issaraks received no recognition at all from the conference, whereas in Laos the revolutionary 
forces were recognized by being required to regroup in a particular area of the country.  
e author notes that SEATO and the Bandung Conference set up diametrically opposed options for 
Southeast Asia. But the commitments at Bandung were largely unfulﬁlled, and in the following chapter Ang 
Cheng Guan turns his attention to the importance of the Sino-Soviet split that began about the same time. 
He does this by examining how Southeast Asian Communists in each of the countries responded. is posed 
a dilemma for many Communists, who were now getting assistance from both China and the USSR. Most 
had to choose, but the Vietnamese were the important exception. ey managed to retain friendly relations 
with both the USSR and China until after the Vietnam War.  
But perhaps the larger point, as Ang Cheng Guan sees it, is that Communism in insular Southeast Asia was 
largely defeated, very much on the defensive, or a nonentity by the mid-1960s. Indeed, with their dramatic 
defeat in Indonesia, they only posed a serious problem in the Indochinese countries. Overall this is a useful 
discussion of Soviet and Chinese connections with regional Communist organizations. 
Roundtable-XX-39 
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Ang Cheng Guan then devotes an entire chapter to the Vietnam War. He examines how each country 
responded to the war, though the chapter contains observations on other topics as well, including much on 
the formation of ASEAN. As for the war itself, the account is necessarily sketchy. For example, it gives little 
context for President Richard Nixon’s decision to resume bombing Hanoi (Linebacker II) after Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger and North Vietnam’s lead negotiator Le Duc o had agreed on preliminary terms of 
peace; the book states only that “at the last moment, Nixon decided to launch controversial Linebacker II 
(Christmas bombings) to pressure Hanoi to accede to the revised peace terms and to assure South Vietnam of 
American support” (154).   
e ﬁnal chapter, “Ending the Cold War Chasm,” is particularly interesting, with the main focus being the 
falling out of Vietnam and China, which resulted in a brief war between the two countries in 1979 when 
Communist China invaded Communist Vietnam in response to Vietnam’s invasion of Communist 
Kampuchea (Cambodia). e split between China and Vietnam had important impacts on the remaining 
Communist parties in Southeast Asia and also inﬂuenced the responses of regional countries to the 
Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. For example, the ais moved closer to China because they disliked the 
Vietnamese being so close to their borders. With the end of the Cold War, the importance of Communism 
faded in Southeast Asia, with the Philippines being the only country in the region which faced a meaningful 
Communist insurgency. 
 A couple of criticisms: the book lacks a certain emotional appeal that should, I think, be a part of the story. 
ough Ang Cheng Guan acknowledges that as many as one million people died in the aftermath of the coup 
attempt in Indonesia in 1965, for example, the human tragedy is scarcely discussed. e focus is mostly on 
the geopolitical and diplomatic factors. Similarly, his analysis of Ne Win’s leadership in Burma is astute and 
helpful in understanding how Ne Win maneuvered diplomatically. But there is next to nothing about him 
destroying democracy in the country and engaging in disastrous economic policies that drove the once 
prosperous country back decades and set the stage for the Revolution of 1988. And most important, the 
Khmer Rouge government in Cambodia is dealt with as an ordinary government, even while it was engaged 
in something akin to genocide against its own people. Nor are the Vietnamese credited with saving Cambodia 
with their invasion late in 1978, even if it was not undertaken entirely for humanitarian reasons. Even Prince 
Sihanouk, who had little love for any Vietnamese, applauded their action in this case. 
Two other small issues. e author asserts that from the beginning the United States “had made it quite clear 
. . . they it had no intention of keeping the Philippines as a colony indeﬁnitely” (20). In fact, during the Taft 
period (1900-1913) the Republicans hoped that eventually the Filipinos would want to remain under 
American rule, and so they deliberately kept the future indeﬁnite and undeﬁned. (On this point, see Peter W. 
Stanley’s excellent book, A Nation in the Making: e Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921).3 It was 
only with Woodrow Wilson who came to oﬃce in 1913 (the book mistakenly says “1923,” 20) that the 
United States ﬁnally made it oﬃcial U.S. policy that independence was in fact the American goal. at 
happened with the passage of the Jones Act in 1916. 
More disturbing is that, in the context of a discussion about ‘Operation Spectrum’ in Singapore in 1987 in 
which twenty-two persons, mostly Catholics, were arrested and charged with attempting to ‘overthrow the 
                                                     
3 Peter W. Stanley, A Nation in the Making: e Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1974). 
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government and establish a communist state’ (190), the author gives some credence to a conspiracy theory 
that has emerged recently that ‘liberation theology’ was the result of a Soviet plot. e alleged conspiracy is 
based on an account by a KGB spy who defected. Ang Cheng Guan is agnostic about the theory’s validity but 
does not refute it. Including this highly questionable theory was unnecessary to his larger discussion about the 
Singapore development, and the book would have been better if this ﬂimsy allegation was left out of it.4  
Despite these criticisms and questions, this is a very useful book, one that takes the focus oﬀ of the United 
States (without, however, ignoring the American impact) and attempts to show how Southeast Asians viewed 
developments during the Cold War. It is also a useful summary of Communist movements and parties in the 
Southeast Asian countries and how the governments responded to them.  
 
                                                     
4 For an informed discussion that asserts this conspiracy theory is “rubbish,” see the analysis of Kerry Walters, a 
distinguished philosopher at Gettysburg College: https://www.huﬃngtonpost.com/kerry-walters/the-truth-about-
liberatio_b_8927478.html 
H-Diplo Roundtable-XX-39 
9 | P a g e  
 
Review by Mattias Fibiger, Harvard Business School 
ng Cheng Guan has produced an impressive account of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. It is so on 
three accounts. First, it encapsulates ten countries and seven decades within a manageable sum of 
pages. Second, it wields a vast array of sources, including archival documents from the United 
Kingdom, United States, and Australia; English-language print media from Southeast Asia and the wider 
world; autobiographies and memoirs of key personages; and the voluminous secondary literature. And third, 
it sets forth arguments that will inspire future scholarship on the region’s international history. 
Consider Ang’s relocation of the temporal boundaries of the Cold War. Following on the work of Odd Arne 
Westad, who characterizes the Cold War as originating in processes that began at the turn of the twentieth 
century, Ang claims the Cold War in Southeast Asia emerged during the interwar period.1 In these decades, 
he explains, the ideological and organizational repertoires of Communism ﬁrst began to shape Southeast 
Asians’ struggles for national emancipation and social revolution. Not, Ang hastens to add, because the Soviet 
Union launched any tightly controlled scheme to promote revolution in the region—its capacity to do so was 
always limited, given its far remove and its focus on Europe. Instead, revolutionaries like Tan Malaka in the 
Dutch East Indies and Ho Chi Minh in Indochina, whose proﬁciencies in European languages aﬀorded them 
access to Marxist ideas, traversed the region and established Communist cells, often in concert with their 
more proximate Chinese comrades. But the indigenous Communist movements established by these 
peripatetic ideologues foundered in the years leading up to the Second World War. Ang shows that their 
defeats arose from miscalculations about the readiness of Southeast Asian societies for revolution and 
mismatches between ragtag revolutionary forces and relatively powerful colonial states. Only the Japanese 
invasion of Southeast Asia and the collapse of the institutional, economic, and ideological foundations of 
European colonial rule aﬀorded Southeast Asian Communists with an opportunity to recover. 
Which leads to another of Ang’s most important arguments: Communist movements triumphed when they 
established themselves as the exemplars of anticolonial nationalism, as they did in Vietnam. Where 
nationalism and Communism were eﬀectively decoupled, as in Malaya, Communist movements emerged 
with far less potency. Communists generally mounted the most eﬀective resistance to the Japanese occupation 
of Southeast Asia during the Second World War, which aﬀorded them a measure of nationalist legitimacy. 
is did not go unnoticed by European colonial powers. Most emerged from the war aware that the era of 
formal imperialism was at an end, and they worked to take the wind out of Communist sails by negotiating 
peaceful transfers of power to trusted, conservative indigenous elites. So it went in the Philippines, in Burma, 
in Malaya, and in Singapore. Elsewhere, in Indochina, the recalcitrant French attempted to regain their lost 
possessions through force of arms, fueling the expansion of Communist movements. Indonesia sat somewhere 
between these two trends. ough the Dutch attempted to retake the archipelago, the Americans eventually 
demanded sovereignty be passed to Indonesian elites who had demonstrated their anticommunist bona ﬁdes 
by crushing a leftist uprising at Madiun in 1948. 
In the remainder of the book, the themes become more evanescent, the arguments more embedded, and the 
narrative more unwieldy. Ang dates the beginning of the “conventional” Cold War in Southeast Asia to 
October 1, 1949—the date of the formation of the People’s Republic of China (67). Chinese leader Mao 
Zedong proved far more willing than his Soviet counterparts to export revolution to the Nanyang, and his 
                                                     
1 See Odd Arne Westad, e Cold War: A Global History (New York: Basic Books, 2017). 
A 
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government quickly established ties with most of the region’s Communist movements. China’s entry into the 
Korean War punctuated the emergence of this new, revisionist element in Asia’s international system. e 
possibility of a revolutionary cascade alarmed Southeast Asia’s indigenous elites and their European and 
American patrons. Western resources began ﬂowing into the region, reinforcing anti-Communist regimes 
against leftist challenges. But Ang is careful to note that, even in an international environment structured by 
Cold War competition, Southeast Asian actors retained considerable agency. Indigenous elites shaped the 
trajectory of the Cold War at 1954-55 conferences in Geneva (where Vietnamese Communists extracted 
promises of Chinese aid), in Manila (where Filipino and ai elites extracted pledges of American defense), 
and in Bandung (where representatives of nonaligned states including Indonesia and Burma worked to 
transcend the bipolarity of the Cold War). 
Yet the balance of Ang’s narrative makes clear that it was Geneva and Manila rather than Bandung that would 
deﬁne the rest of Cold War in Southeast Asia. e Sino-Soviet split made Mao and Soviet leader Nikita 
Khrushchev, each of whom was fearful of ceding his claim to leadership of the international Communist 
movement, more responsive to appeals for aid from Southeast Asian leftists.2 Meanwhile anti-Communist 
Southeast Asian elites argued that Chinese meddling lay behind all manner of social and political upheavals, 
and they induced Western governments to funnel men, materiel, and money to the region to reinforce 
conservative regimes.3 Over the following decade, a dichotomy took hold. Outside Indochina, anti-
Communist regimes suppressed all meaningful threats to their authority, including Communist insurgencies 
and other opposition movements organized along liberal, ethnic, or religious lines. So conclusive was the 
Left’s defeat there that one could reasonably argue that, for most of Southeast Asia, the Cold War had already 
reached its end by 1966. In Indochina, however, Communist movements grew only more powerful.  
What happened next is a familiar story, and Ang does not dwell on it. e United States intervened in 
Indochina, purportedly to preserve the non-Communist orientation of South Vietnam. Vietnamese 
Communists, ﬁghting what Ang regards as a “continuation of a colonial war from 1945 against the French,” 
refused to surrender (129). e resulting conﬂict swallowed millions of lives and concluded with an 
Indochina under Communist rule. But it also overshadowed other developments, to which Ang pays greater 
attention. Most of the region’s non-Communist governments banded together to form the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. e ASEAN states, except the Philippines, soon embarked upon 
economic ‘miracles,’ as market economies experienced rapid, shared growth.4 And as they became more 
prosperous and more uniﬁed, most ASEAN states normalized diplomatic relations with a derevolutionizing 
China.5 e end of the Vietnam War also unleashed centrifugal forces within the international Communist 
                                                     
2 See Jeremy Friedman, Shadow Cold War: e Sino-Soviet Competition for the ird World (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2015); omas Christensen, Worse an a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of 
Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
3 See Gregg Brazinsky, Winning the ird World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2017). 
4 World Bank, e East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 1-26. 
5 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 277. 
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movement—the subject of Ang’s ﬁnal chapter. In it, Ang argues that the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 
and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam “marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia” 
(160).  
is brief recapitulation of Ang’s narrative complete, a few methodological and historiographical issues 
warrant comment.  
Ang’s is a decidedly orthodox account. He begins by lamenting the lack of a “standard narrative” of the Cold 
War in Southeast Asia, suggesting that the ﬁeld’s alleged turn away from grand narratives of war and 
diplomacy has rendered historians akin to blind folk attempting to determine the shape of an elephant: each is 
able to grasp an ear, a trunk, a leg, or a tail, but none can envision the beast in its entirety (4). Whether the 
ﬁeld has indeed abandoned the study of war and diplomacy as Ang claims need not delay us here, though the 
proliferation of recent studies listed in his bibliography suggests perhaps it has not.6 More notable is the fact 
that Ang has embraced orthodoxy in another sense. His is a call-and-response narrative in which Communists 
attempted to remake state and society and anticommunists responded. He justiﬁes this choice by suggesting 
that, because the Left ended up losing the Cold War in Southeast Asia, “their perspectives are often ignored, 
forgotten, or interpreted through the lens of the winners” (194). But Ang still inhabits what Anders 
Stephanson has called the “subject-position of an ersatz [anticommunist] policymaker.”7 e book’s central 
preoccupation is Communist organizing. For instance, in exploring the antecedents of the Cold War in 
Southeast Asia, Ang focuses on Comintern activism—not the subjugation of indigenous populations by 
colonial powers, not the integration of indigenous economies into global markets, and not on the growing 
American presence in the region. e reader comes away with the mistaken impression that the Cold War is 
reducible to Communist eﬀorts to remake states and societies, and not much else. 
Ang’s orthodox approach also leads him to give short shrift to the domestic causes and consequences of the 
Cold War. To be sure, Ang gestures in his introduction toward a central insight of Westad’s ﬁeld-deﬁning e 
Global Cold War: that superpower interventions contributed to processes of polarization and militarization 
that left much of the Global South in a state of “semipermanent civil war.”8 But this dynamic does not fully 
emerge in Ang’s account of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. As Stephanson continues, “to write inside the 
‘security problematic’ is to exclude a priori a whole range of possibly more interesting stories.”9 Processes like 
state-building, economic development, ideological polarization, and social militarization—all of which 
                                                     
6 For other recent laments of this kind see Hal Brands, “e Triumph and Tragedy of Diplomatic History,” 
Texas National Security Review 1:1 (December 2017): 132-143; Fredrik Logevall and Kenneth Osgood, “Why Did We 
Stop Teaching Political History?” New York Times, 29 August 2016. 
7 Anders Stephanson, “Commentary: Ideology and Neorealist Mirrors,” Diplomatic History 17:2 (April 1993): 
285-295. 
8 Odd Arne Westad, e Global Cold War: ird World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 398. 
9 Stephanson, “Ideology and Neorealist Mirrors,” 289. 
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depended in no small measure on the intervention of the Cold War’s central protagonists—receive little 
attention in Ang’s book.  
For instance, Ang discounts the September 1972 declaration of martial law in the Philippines, the May 1969 
race riots that led to the reconﬁguration of governance in Malaysia, and the murder of student protesters in 
ailand in 1973 as issues that were “essentially . . . domestic,” only minimally connected to the Cold War 
(156-158). Ang rightly points out that Communists had little to do with the protests, riots, and uprisings that 
preceded these watershed events, but it does not follow that the Cold War was epiphenomenal. In each case, 
ruling elites felt free to suppress challenges to their authority and establish more coercive, exclusionary regimes 
because they could count on American support delivered in accordance with Cold War logic.10 Similarly, in 
his discussion of Indonesia in the period leading up to Major General Soeharto’s military takeover and the 
subsequent mass killings of 1965-66, Ang emphasizes international dimensions: ties between the Partai 
Komunis Indonesia (PKI) and China, and between the Indonesian military and the United States. 
International connections such as these help explain why the leaders of the PKI and Indonesian military grew 
more willing to challenge each other as President Sukarno’s health waned. But they cannot explain the depth 
of political polarization that contributed to the eruption of such gut-wrenching violence following the 
September 30th Movement.11 Finally, nary a mention is made of the genocide in Cambodia, another of the 
bloodiest episodes of the Cold War. To these complaints Ang will likely plead lack of space, since a book of 
this size cannot hope to incorporate all the twists and turns that contoured individual national histories in 
Southeast Asia. But the book’s failure to explain why and how the Cold War penetrated the region so 
deeply—fracturing not only societies but also communities and even families, as Heonik Kwon has shown—
undermines its claim to represent an overarching synthesis.12 
What emerges is a paradox. Ang is right to assert the need for a monographic overview of the Cold War in 
Southeast Asia. His Interpretive History helps meet that need, summarizing in a brisk and engaging way most 
of the conﬂicts and crises that erupted in the region during the Cold War. Yet if the book’s orthodoxy is its 
greatest strength, it is also its greatest weakness. e book fails to reckon with the immense changes the Cold 
War wrought in Southeast Asia—the reconﬁguration of institutions and economies, the polarization of 
polities and identities, and the destruction of lives and landscapes. Archival challenges continue to make 
excavating these stories diﬃcult, and much exciting work remains to be done. 
 
                                                     
10 Mattias Fibiger, “e International and Transnational Construction of Authoritarian Rule in Island 
Southeast Asia, 1969-1977,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 2018. 
11 See Geoﬀrey Robinson, e Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-1966 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2018), 83-117. 
12 Heonik Kwon, e Other Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 
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Review by Jürgen Haacke, London School of Economics and Political Science 
erhaps surprisingly, the number of scholarly publications that oﬀer a regionwide and systematic 
account of the Cold War in Southeast Asia remains more limited than one might expect. Ang Cheng 
Guan’s latest single-authored book, which promises ‘to provide an up-to-date and coherent account of 
the Cold War as it was played out in Southeast Asia based on forgotten and the latest research ﬁndings…” 
(2), is thus both an overdue and welcome eﬀort.  
Ang oﬀers an ‘interpretive history’ of the Cold War in Southeast Asia. is involves him exploring the 
understandings of regional policy-makers as well as the interpretations of relevant key events and decisions by 
the growing number of scholars who have studied these. An important objective for Ang is to highlight the 
agency of regional governments, all the while he is also trying to put the spotlight on those who organised in 
the name of and fought for the political left.  
Diﬀerentiating between developments linked to Cold War dynamics and those arising from “more complex 
local causes” (6), Ang has produced a very readable and important book that should be of interest and value 
not only to students of history but also appeal to those studying the contemporary international politics of 
Southeast Asia. Organised chronologically, the outstanding feature of the book is Ang’s cross-regional 
coverage. is allows for broad comparisons, but the book oﬀers readers a signiﬁcant amount of useful detail 
as Ang weaves together his narrative.  
Important basic arguments that emerge include the following: ﬁrst, the Cold War in Southeast Asia began to 
take shape during the interwar period, as local struggles for equality and sovereignty led – inter alia- to the 
formation of Communist parties across the region. More generally, Ang’s argument is that to understand the 
origins of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, due regard should be given to processes of decolonization and 
nation-building. Following repression by colonial governments, Southeast Asian Communist parties were 
‘resuscitated’ during World War II, notwithstanding diﬀerent experiences and developments across the 
region. As Ang puts it: “It would be correct to say that it was war rather than the systemic failure of 
colonialism that brought about the revival of the communist movements in Southeast Asia” (28). Ang argues 
that even though Communist parties operated under direction from Moscow from 1943-1949, the 
Communist-led insurgencies under way by 1948 in Burma, the Philippines, Malaya, and Indonesia are best 
understood in relation to their respective local context.  
Second, Ang shows that once the Communists had won the Chinese civil war, it was Mao who was keen 
about the establishment of an Asian Communist Information Bureau, not Moscow (52-53). Indeed, the 
United States and China (and not the Soviet Union) would subsequently be the main Cold War antagonists 
in Southeast Asia. Washington placed Vietnam in “the context of a West versus East, democracy versus 
communism dichotomy” by the end of 1949 (56).  Washington and Beijing then faced each other in the 
Korean War.  Also, most of the local Communist parties in Southeast Asia looked towards Beijing.  As Ang 
notes, “… every communist party in Asia had a resident representative in China…” (54).   
ird, Southeast Asian countries found it diﬃcult to stay out of the Cold War even though they may have 
tried. As regards the early Cold War period, Ang argues that “the signiﬁcance of the 1954 Geneva Conference 
lies in what it reveals about the dynamics within the communist fraternity-which was ultimately national 
interest” (70). He demonstrates this with respect to the outcome of the conference, arguing that the Chinese 
were able to reach a solution to the Indochina question at the expense of the Vietnamese Communists 
P 
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“because Beijing was their sole military supplier and in control of the only aid-supply route to Vietnam” (73). 
Ang also highlights just how controversial the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO)was among Southeast Asian governments and how the Bandung Conference served to map out a 
political alternative for the region. In Ang’s words, both “SEATO and the Bandung Conference are 
manifestations of the contrasting and seemingly irreconcilable strategic preferences of various Southeast Asian 
states” (78).  
Fourth, Ang also shows how by the 1960s Communist parties were weakened and eﬀectively destroyed across 
much of maritime Southeast Asia, with incumbent governments positioning themselves in the Western camp. 
ough domestic struggles are a crucial aspect of his analysis, Ang not surprisingly also sees the United States 
as having exploited these struggles to bring about both outcomes. As he argues, for instance, the 1957 coup by 
Field Marshal Sarit anarat “provided the opportunity for the United States to persuade the new ai 
leadership to reverse ailand’s policy towards China” (93). More controversial was the U.S. role in Indonesia 
in October 1965, which extended to embassy staﬀ on their “own initiative” apparently “passing to the 
noncommunist side those lists with the PKI leaders names and information of senior cadre system” (122). As 
Ang also comments: “Although the oﬃcial narrative of the Suharto regime insisted that China colluded with 
the PKI in the abortive coup, we in fact know very little of the Chinese and Soviet roles in the coup due to 
the lack of access-even to this day-to the documents on the communist side” (123). He concludes that “…the 
PKI, contrary to the oﬃcial account, was not the mastermind of the 1965 coup…” (124).  
Fifth, Southeast Asian countries seriously diﬀered in how they approached the war in Vietnam. According to 
Ang, “Of all the Southeast Asian leaders, Lee Kuan Yew was by far the most vocal in his support of American 
involvement in Vietnam” (138), a position which he attributes to sub-regional security dynamics in 
Singapore’s neighbourhood. However, while remaining committed to a non-aligned and neutralist foreign 
policy, Ang argues that even Burma’s Ne Win did not want “the United States to lose the war although he 
feared that escalation might involve Burma” (131). Notably, policy responses to the winding down of the 
Vietnam War were broadly similar among the ASEAN countries. As Ang demonstrates, these states vowed to 
and did engage China against the backdrop of the Nixon Doctrine, including the two U.S.-allies, ailand 
and the Philippines. Even the Sino-Vietnamese relationship temporarily improved after it had deteriorated 
because of “Beijing’s disapproval of the strategy adopted in the Tet Oﬀensive and also because of its 
unhappiness over Hanoi’s reluctance to side with Beijing in the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute” (153). Ang 
notes that upon the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement in February 1973, ASEAN original member 
countries not only began to re-consider their relationship with Hanoi, but upon the communist victory in 
Indochina also found a new gear in relation to regional cooperation.  
Ang takes the beginning of the end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia to have been the “implosion within the 
Asian communist camp” (160). is is essentially a story of internal weakness and a lack of external support 
but not necessarily a complete end to armed resistance or insurgency. Ang rightly focuses on the end of the 
USSR’s underwriting of the Vietnamese economy, the subsequent normalization of China-Vietnam relations, 
and the agreement on settling the Cambodia conﬂict. He also notes that the “…communist parties in 
Southeast Asia were the biggest casualty of the Sino-Vietnamese fallout and subsequent Sino-ASEAN 
‘alliance’ against the Vietnamese” (185) and -inter alia- seems to link this point to the fate of the Communist 
Party of Burma. What is clear though is that despite the demise of Communist parties, armed resistance 
continues. Commenting on the Philippines, Ang thus for instance argues that there remains a communist 
insurgency problem in form of the New People’s Army but “its strength and inﬂuence have waned…” (188).  
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It is not obvious that Southeast Asia’s Cold War oﬀers insights that radically depart from the understanding 
readers will have had before taking up this book. But that was not the intention. What Ang has instead done 
is to write a book that aims to oﬀer a ‘state-of-the-ﬁeld account’ of the Cold War in Southeast Asia and he has 
successfully managed to pull many threads together to produce an empirically rich cross-regional comparison. 
Ang’s account suggests that to date there are relatively few major controversies in the literature. Where these 
have taken place, he highlights them (as in the case of diﬀerent readings of what happened at the 1954 
Geneva Conference), and lays out the opposing arguments and interpretations.  
Ang draws on an array of primary sources and secondary literature and generally seems on very ﬁrm ground. 
Nevertheless, some aspects of his account are open to challenge. For instance, in his discussion of Burma-
China relations in the 1960s and 1970s, Ang understates the level of conﬂict that raged in Burma between the 
government forces and the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and the account is too brief to allow us to 
appreciate the scale of human losses suﬀered on both sides. According to Bertil Lintner, “e Chinese poured 
more aid into the CPB eﬀort than any other Communist movement outside Indochina”.1 Ang also argues 
that “Sino-Burmese acrimony was ‘relatively short-lived’ and the relationship gradually re-normalized from 
1968” (132). is seems a rather controversial reading. It misses at this juncture the point that at least from 
1968 to 1973, Chinese ‘volunteers’ formed the bulk of the CPB’s ﬁghting forces (Ang mentions them in a 
later chapter). Maung Aung Myoe also dates the withdrawal of Chinese advisers to late 1978.2 Ang himself 
notes that even by 1980, the issue of Chinese support for the CPB continued to impact bilateral relations, 
leaving Ne Win “disappointed and angry” (163). In line with the eﬀort to trace the fate of communist 
movements, Ang might also have focused on the successful eﬀorts that the military undertook to prevent a 
link-up between old CPB areas in Pegu Yoma and Irrawaddy Delta and the base areas on the border with 
China.  
Ang also touches on the ‘economic dimension’ of the Cold War in Southeast Asia (191-193). However, after 
justifying why it “would be remiss not to address … the economic development of the Southeast Asian 
countries during the Cold War years” (191), the discussion seems fairly cursory. One reason for this, Ang 
appears to suggest, is that “one cannot deny the fault of communism as a ﬂawed economic ideology where the 
state controlled everything…” (192). Nonetheless, a clearer link to seemingly relevant insights concerning the 
economic interests and policy beliefs of political elites (for example, Natasha Hamilton-Hart’s Hard Interests, 
Soft Illusions) would possibly have been appropriate to demonstrate and explain just how comfortable some 
Southeast Asian elites were with Washington as a ‘fundamentally benign great power’ during the Cold War 
years.3  
Finally, it is important to note that in so far as Ang has examined how past Chinese initiatives and U.S. policy 
shifts impacted on Southeast Asian countries, the arguments and the empirical detail Ang puts forward are 
                                                     
1 Bertil Lintner, e Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) (Ithaca: SEAP, Cornell University, 
1990), 26. 
2 Maung Aung Myoe, In the Name of Pauk-Phaw: Myanmar’s China Policy Since 1948 (Singapore: ISEAS, 
2011), 132.  
3 Natasha Hamilton-Hart, Hard Interests, Soft Illusions: Southeast Asia and American Power (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2012), 13.  
Roundtable-XX-39 
16 | P a g e  
also bound to be of interest to those scholars who are working on triangular ‘hedging’ by ASEAN states, 
involving relations with both the U.S. and China. As Ang argues, “Soon after Johnson’s announcement [not 
to run in the 1968 election], anat Khoman said that ailand should not be blamed if it were to seek an 
accommodation with Beijing” (143).  And as Ang makes clear, “Despite Johnson’s [security] assurances [vis-à-
vis ailand], by the end of 1968 Bangkok was reevaluating its relations with Washington and Beijing” (143). 
As regards Manila, Ang states clearly that “[a] week after Johnson’s 31 March 1968 announcement, Marcos 
said that if the Americans pulled out of Asia, Manila might have to reach an accommodation with Beijing” 
(145-146). Given developments in more recent years, these kinds of points make for interesting historical 
parallels that analysts should probably bear in mind.  
It is unlikely that Southeast Asia’s Cold War is going to be the last word on the topic. But it oﬀers a well-
crafted and empirically rich account that deserves to be widely read.  
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Review by Michael J. Montesano, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore 
mong historians of modern Southeast Asia, ‘the Cold War’ is in the air. A fortnight before composing 
this review, I showed a copy of Southeast Asia’s Cold War to a group of ai doctoral students from 
Tokyo’s Waseda University as we chatted over coﬀee near their campus. One of the students rushed to 
take a picture of the book’s elegantly designed cover with his smartphone. When I asked why, he replied with 
unconcealed sarcasm that he must absolutely bring the book’s publication to the attention of all of his peers 
back home who were working so avidly on the songkhram yen.1 Ang Cheng Guan is aware of the fashion for 
which this student expressed disdain.2 While refraining from even the suggestion of sarcasm, and displaying 
characteristic balance and moderation, Ang explicitly pitches his new book as a corrective to much of the 
work in which the fashion has resulted. e book may amount, however, to far more than a modest 
corrective. Rather, it poses a strong and fundamental challenge to easy acceptance of ‘the Cold War’ as a 
useful framework in the study of the history of the Southeast Asian region. 
Southeast Asia’s Cold War draws on a staggering program of reading to meet two needs. e ﬁrst is for a 
synthetic account—in a single volume, by a single author—of the course of the Cold War in the region from, 
as it were, ‘start to ﬁnish.’ e second need grows out of the inﬂuence of “the so-called cultural turn” 
embraced by historians of Southeast Asia under the apparent inﬂuence of scholarship on Europe in the “New 
Cold War History” (3). Ang points out that that latter scholarship complements extant, well developed 
scholarship on the politics and foreign relations of the Cold War in Europe. One cannot, however, say the 
same thing for Southeast Asia, in the relative absence of work on the politics and international relations of the 
era of the Cold War there. As if reversing the historiographic sequence, then, he seeks to lay out an account of 
the politics and international relations of the era to complement recent work on the region that has been 
marked by the cultural turn. 
Rigor in meeting these two needs, or achieving these two objectives, demands clear-headedness about three 
matters. ey are the historian’s working deﬁnition of ‘the Cold War,’ her or his dating of its origins and 
conclusion, and the approach and the perspective that she or he adopts. As to the ﬁrst matter, Ang deﬁnes the 
Cold War concisely, as “the international contest between the United States on the one side and the Soviet 
Union and China on the other” (9). On ﬁrst reading this is perfectly reasonable. But the formulation is 
nevertheless telling; Ang refers to the “United States” and the “Soviet Union” rather than to America and 
Russia, but to “China” rather than to the People’s Republic of China.3 Regarding the second matter, time 
frame, Ang is precise at the front end but, equally tellingly, not at the back end. at is, he dates the origins of 
the Cold War in Southeast Asia to 1919 in order to include the interwar-era activities of the Comintern—
                                                     
1 Literally, ‘cold war’ and, in this instance, ‘the Cold War.’ 
2 Not only does his book make this awareness clear, but he and I have also discussed that fashion over a series of 
long lunches in recent years. 
3 Note the contrast with the title of the classic ‘revisionist’ work by Fred Harvey Harrington’s and William 
Appleman Williams’s student Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966 (New York: Wiley, 1967). 
is book has appeared in ten editions, of which the most recent is America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006 
(Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008).  
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founded in that year—and of the region’s Communist parties in his account. In contrast, and with reference 
to the fall of the Berlin Wall, he writes,  
There is, however, not a moment, event, or image of equal signiﬁcance that would mark an 
end to the Cold War in Southeast Asia. Yet without so much as a whimper, the Cold War did 
come to a denouement in Southeast Asia . . . [T]he “wall” that divided the communists and the 
anticommunists in Southeast Asia had already been breaking down piece by piece, albeit at 
diﬀerent paces in each country, for almost a decade before 9 November 1989. (193) 
On the third matter, Ang commits himself in the volume to an approach grounded in “international history” 
and to a perspective “from within [the region] rather than without,” one that “puts the Southeast Asian actors 
to the forefront of the events” (5, 194, 2). 
Ang’s choices in confronting these matters have consequences. e following three sections of this review 
consider the consequence of each of these matters in turn. ose consequences both illustrate what makes 
Southeast Asia’s Cold War a book of signiﬁcance and point directly to the message that younger aspiring 
scholars of ‘the Cold War’ in the region may want to take away from the work of this senior scholar: please 
reconsider your plans. 
* * * 
Deﬁning ‘the Cold War’ with explicit reference to the role of the Soviet Union serves, on the one hand, to 
establish a connection between the conﬂict as it may have unfolded in Southeast Asia and as it did unfold in 
Europe, and perhaps in other parts of the world. On the other hand, it calls attention to the speciﬁcs of Soviet 
interest and involvement in the region. Ang Cheng Guan is scrupulous and informative in his treatment of 
that interest and that involvement. 
e story of the Comintern’s establishment of a Far Eastern Bureau in Shanghai in 1926 and of its use of the 
storied Indonesian and Vietnamese nationalist ﬁgures Tan Melaka and Hoồ  Chí Minh as its agents after 1930 
is a familiar one. Ang adds valuable context in noting the attention that Communist parties in Southeast Asia 
paid to the organization’s changing policy line, not least with the approach of the Paciﬁc War and the need to 
confront Japanese fascism. At the same time, he also notes the crucial ties of the Malayan Communist Party to 
the Chinese Communist Party rather than to the Comintern and discusses Hoồ  Chí Minh’s early links to both 
the French Communist Party and to ‘united front’ politics in southern China. He explains the reality that 
prewar communism in Siam was basically the province of Chinese and Vietnamese resident in the country but 
with close ties to China and Vietnam, rather than of Siamese themselves. And he makes clear the Comintern’s 
lack of interest in Burma. Taken together, these factors serve to put Moscow’s limited reach and relevance 
into perspective. In fact, as Ang suggests, fear of the Soviet Union and of its determination to export 
revolution, doubtless rooted in European realities, fueled the imperialist powers’ concern with the spread of 
Communism in Southeast Asia more than did actual Soviet or Soviet-backed activity there. is concern led 
those powers to crush most of the Communist parties in the region by the mid-1930s. Only the 
circumstances of war and the need to resist Japanese occupiers led to the subsequent recoveries of these 
parties, though Ang notes the role of the Comintern in the resuscitation of the Indochinese Communist Party 
even before 1941. 
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After the end of the Paciﬁc War, Soviet involvement and interest in Southeast Asia proved hardly less tenuous 
than before the conﬂict. Ang notes Moscow’s lack of attention to the region in the immediate postwar period, 
its willingness to cede the  “leading role in Asia” to Beijing until the time of the Sino-Soviet split at the end of 
the 1950s (106), and the intensiﬁcation of ties between Hanoi and Moscow in the years following the fall of 
Saigon in 1975. at intensiﬁcation came in the context of mounting tensions between Hanoi and Beijing. 
But it did not signal a broad pattern of increased Soviet involvement in the region, and the initiation of 
reformist policies under Communist Party of the Soviet Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev before 
long made the Hanoi’s dependence on Moscow a liability for Vietnam. 
e picture that emerges from Ang’s narrative is therefore one of a Soviet Union only marginally relevant—
with the partial exception of Vietnam, a case to which I return below—to Southeast Asia during the era of the 
Cold War. is picture justiﬁes his aﬃrmation of the continuing validity of Akira Iriye’s observation of more 
than four decades ago, concerning the “diﬃculty [of] ﬁtting the Asian picture [of the Cold War] into an 
overall framework” (11).4 at diﬃculty results above all from the imperative to assign to the Soviet Union 
relevance to the Cold War in, in this case, Southeast Asia—an imperative whose origins lie in studies of the 
phenomenon focused on Europe. 
* * * 
Ang Cheng Guan’s decision to begin his account in 1919 and his incorporation of the interwar activities of 
the Comintern into that account serve as the basis for an arresting and stimulating argument. In contrasting 
the latter organization’s “anti-imperialist and anticolonial agenda” with the lack of support in American policy 
for Southeast Asians’ “aspiration for equality and sovereignty,” he explicitly links what he terms interwar 
“antecedents” of the Cold War in Southeast Asia to the contest between the Soviet Union and the United 
States in the region after 1945 (16). While he hastens to add that that contest was not only one between two 
states, but also one between “two diﬀerent ideologies, social and economic systems,” his choice of moment of 
origins nevertheless brings a series of wrinkles (16). One, treated above, relates to the discontinuity in, and the 
marginal importance of, the Soviet Union’s involvement in Southeast Asia, resulting from the lack of interest 
in the region that more often than not obtained in Moscow. A second wrinkle resulting from Ang’s decision 
to place the origins of Southeast Asia’s Cold War in the interwar period relates, in contrast, to the continuities 
in that contest that both this decision and his hesitation to assign a speciﬁc moment to the end of Southeast 
Asia’s putative Cold War suggest. 
His attention to interwar developments notwithstanding, Ang argues without qualiﬁcation  
that it was Communist China more than the Soviet Union that fuelled the Cold War in 
Southeast Asia, and thus if one has to identify a point crucial to the development of the Cold 
War in post-World War Two Southeast Asia, it would be 1949, speciﬁcally 1 October which 
marked the inauguration of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). (52) 
                                                     
4 Ang is here quoting Akira Iriye, e Cold War in Asia: A Historical Introduction (Englewood Cliﬀs: Prentice-
Hall, 1974), 6. Iriye seems to have made this observation with speciﬁc reference to the origins of the Cold War. I apply it 
more broadly. 
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Terming the PRC, even from its earliest years, “a new subsidiary communist hub in East and Southeast Asia,” 
Ang details the network of extensive ties between the Chinese Communist Party and each of the parties in 
that latter region that quickly developed after 1949 (54). Even before the Sino-Soviet split, the PRC 
functioned in relation to Southeast Asia as a subsidiary that enjoyed great apparent latitude from its notional 
headquarters in the distant and relatively inattentive Soviet Union. e ties established after 1949 “aﬀected 
the domestic politics of the various Southeast Asian states,” and their signiﬁcance highlights postwar 
continuity with the interwar importance of a not-yet-the-PRC China as a point of contact for the Communist 
parties of the region (67). is continuity stands in contrast to the discontinuity of the Soviet Union’s role in 
Ang’s narrative. 
As that narrative unfolds, the continuity of Southeast Asian actors’ attention to the question of how to 
position their states, societies, and parties in relation to now-the-PRC China emerges as one of its central 
themes. Space allows reference to just a few examples. But prominent among them are the encounters of 
Indonesia’s, ailand’s, and the Philippines’ representatives with PRC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou 
Enlai at the time of the Bandung Conference of April 1955 and the keenness in the capitals of non-
Communist Southeast Asian to forge relations with Beijing as, in the 1970s, American failure in Indochina 
loomed and then arrived.  Even Vietnam’s striking, albeit abortive, eﬀort to reach out to members of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the period after the fall of Saigon and the uniﬁcation of 
the country reﬂected above all the Hanoi leadership’s concern over the state of its relations with its giant 
neighbor to the north.  
e prominence of the negotiation of a relationship with China in Ang’s account may explain his reluctance 
to assign a ﬁrm date to serve as paired book-end to 1919 or 1949 in marking the conclusion of Southeast 
Asia’s Cold War. 5 For the region’s work to negotiate that relationship is ongoing; neither 1975, 1978, 1991, 
nor any later date brought it to an end. Geography, demography, and economics make it as constant a feature 
of the region’s past and present as its seas, straits, deltas, plains and mountain ranges. Like those geographic 
features, too, the Sino-Southeast Asian relationship preceded Western colonialism in the region. According to  
one perspective, in fact, the era of Western imperialism in Southeast Asia represented little so much as a re-
ordering of that relationship, one destined to give way to successive later re-orderings.6 
One of those subsequent re-orderings in Sino-Southeast Asian relations, Ang’s book suggests, followed in the 
wake of October 1949. To the degree that the United States and to a lesser degree the Soviet Union, along 
with anti-Communism often rooted in domestic Southeast Asian realities rather than in international 
relations, seemed for a time to deﬁne that re-ordering, we may view the period in question as that of ‘the Cold 
War.’  But in choosing to do so, we must also take cognizance of the risk of introducing a distraction into the 
study of the recent history of the region. 
                                                     
5 Ang has in fact completed a substantial follow-up study on Southeast Asia after the Cold War whose 
publication readers of Southeast Asia’s Cold War will eagerly await. 
6 For a both trenchant and typically elegant, and also perhaps exaggerated and even innocent, statement of this 
view as it relates to ‘post-Cold War’ relations between ailand and China, see Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, 
“ailand Is Not Lost,” New York Review of Books, 24 May 2018, 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/05/24/thailand-is-not-lost/, downloaded 18 October 2018. 
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* * * 
e adoption in Southeast Asia’s Cold War of a “from within” perspective deﬁnes the book (194). e 
Southeast Asianist may, as she or he reads through the volume, ﬁnd that perspective so comfortable, familiar, 
and even reassuring as to take it for granted. In part, this apparent familiarity is due to the often astonishing 
range of scholarship on Southeast Asia on which Ang Cheng Guan draws. ese same materials enable him to 
tell a story unfamiliar to the diplomatic historian, to oﬀer a work of international history in which policy 
debates and decision-making in extra-regional capitals never become the focus of attention. 
One highlight of Ang’s “from within” approach comes in the book’s masterful sixth chapter, “Ending the 
Cold War Chasm,” which treats Vietnam’s complicated relations with the PRC after 1975, its invasion of 
Cambodia to oust the Khmer Rouge regime in late 1978, and its brief border war with the PRC early the 
following year.  In judging that latter “Chinese exercise of inﬂuence in invading Vietnam . . . certainly a 
success,” at least in long-term perspective, Ang reaches a conclusion that will challenge some readers to 
rethink their views (181). Even more provocative, however, is the counterfactual exercise that leads him to 
ask, in the book’s concluding chapter,  
what if the Vietnamese had not invaded Kampuchea? The fact that Hanoi did invade in 
December 1978 marked the fracturing and rearrangement of the Cold War order in Southeast 
Asia and with hindsight the beginning of the end of the Cold War in the region. (197)  
In describing that rearrangement, Ang notes the development of relations between the PRC and non-
Communist Southeast Asian governments that followed Hanoi’s capture of Phnom Penh. ose relations saw 
ASEAN work with the PRC and the United States toward the 1991 resolution of the sustained crisis in which 
that capture resulted. From the same Southeast Asian perspective, however, one might equally well pose a 
series of questions very diﬀerent from Ang’s counterfactual. Why did ASEAN governments react to Vietnam’s 
termination of the Khmer Rouge’s genocidal rule as they did? What motivated their alarm over Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia and their willingness to work, in varying degrees, with China to bring that 
occupation to an end? And what, in long-term perspective, ought we to learn from these reactions? Again, 
answers to these questions, as to Ang’s own, must center on continuities in Southeast Asian polities’ 
negotiation of their relationships with China. ey must also take into account the fact, noted above, that the 
origins of the rapprochement on the part of those polities and the PRC that deﬁned the 1980s pre-dated 
December 1978. 
e book’s sixth chapter also includes a short, smart discussion of “the economic dimension of the Cold War 
in Southeast Asia,” which complements the rest of the book admirably, its brevity notwithstanding (191). 
Ang points out there the pattern of rapid economic growth that marked most of ASEAN as the era of the 
Cold War ended and the relevance of that development to any understanding of the place of that era in 
Southeast Asia’s recent history. is observation is consequential. e rapid growth of economies in the 
region in the period preceding the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 had a lasting impact on the region’s 
conception of its own identity. In that regard, it epitomizes a number of phenomena to which Ang’s 
Southeast-Asia-centric perspective leads him to draw attention.  
One of these phenomena was “the common and mutual distrust between the Southeast Asian incumbent 
governments and those on the left side of the ideological divide” that prevailed at the time of the Bandung 
Conference, as well as beforehand and afterwards (87). Others included a phenomenon so broad as the 
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stirrings during the era of the Cold War of communalism as a source of domestic tensions across Southeast 
Asia that would in time supplant Communism, and of one so narrow as the dismay of “progressive Singapore 
architects” at the polarization in which oﬃcial anti-Communism resulted during that era (197). Taken 
together, such phenomena underline the fact that, as well as negotiating a position in relation to China, the 
era saw Southeast Asian states and societies grappling with the need to negotiate their own identities.  
Bandung oﬀers a further case in point. In calling attention to the participation in the gathering there of such 
major Southeast Asian intellectual—oh, yes, and also diplomatic—ﬁgures as Philippine Ambassador to the 
United States Carlos P. Romulo and ai Foreign Minister Wan Waithayakon, Ang reminds us of the range 
of concerns that such men brought with them to the capital of West Java.7 Discussions held there between 
various Southeast Asian participants and Zhou Enlai and concerning the Overseas Chinese populations of the 
states in the region and their citizenship status related to more than those states’ negotiation of their 
relationship to the PRC. ose discussions cut to the core of postcolonial national-identity formation. We are 
clearly in the realm of something less tractable than a ‘global’ or even merely regional contest between two 
ideologies. 
* * * 
e preceding sections of this review argue that, with exemplary balance, Ang Cheng Guan succeeds in 
Southeast Asia’s Cold War in situating the region’s experience of the era of the Cold War on two planes. One 
of these planes is the history of the unending need of Southeast Asian states and societies to work out their 
relationships with China. e other is that of the particularly intense need during the decades after 1945 for 
those same states and societies to forge new identities, and to structure new or to fortify old political and 
social orders.  
General Romulo and Prince Wan were not alone in operating on both these planes, as Mitchell Tan’s path-
breaking work on Sang Phatthanothai—the journalist and labor union leader who ﬁgured prominently in 
Bangkok’s contacts with Beijing in the period after the Bandung Conference—makes clear.8 Like those of the 
two more famous ﬁgures, Sang’s activities illustrated the intersection of the two planes on which Ang situates 
Southeast Asia’s experience of the decades that his book treats. And, like General Romulo’s own activities 
during the same period, they brought Sang into direct contact with the wider world in which, above all in 
                                                     
7 For an important recent assessment of General Romulo’s signiﬁcance, see Lisandro E. Claudio, Liberalism and 
the Postcolony: inking the State in the 20th-Century Philippines (Singapore: NUS Press, 2017), 81-110. is dazzling and 
moving book underlines the disadvantages of adopting a ‘Cold War’ perspective on recent Philippine and Southeast 
Asian history on which the present review harps. e discussion of Prince Wan in Tomas Larsson, “In Search of 
Liberalism: Ideological Traditions, Translations and Troubles in ailand,” SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in 
Southeast Asia 32:3 (November 2017): 531-561, esp. 538-539, 542, 552-553, has a similar eﬀect. For an important, and 
relevant, recent treatment of Prince Wan’s thought, see Saichon Sattayanurak, 10 panyachon sayam lem 2 panyachon lang 
kanpatiwat 2475 [Ten Siamese intellectuals, volume 2: Intellectuals after the 1932 revolution] (Bangkok: Open Books, 
2014), 142-255. 
8 Mitchell Tan, “Confronting Communism: Sang Phatthanothai and ailand’s Dynamic Relationship with 
the Cold War World,” SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 33:1 (March 2018): 59-115.  
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Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a dangerous, apparently existential, conﬂict. 
We call that conﬂict the Cold War. 
An important strand in the thinking of Americans, outsiders to the region, saw Southeast Asia as a theatre in 
that conﬂict that they also called the Cold War. As Ang reminds us, U.S. President Dwight David Eisenhower 
ﬁrst explained “the ‘falling domino’ principle,” in April 1954, with speciﬁc reference to Southeast Asia (69). 
Some thoughtful and deeply engaged Southeast Asians themselves shared Washington’s understanding of 
their region as a Cold War theatre. Some in the region also saw the beneﬁt of playing along with that 
understanding, if only because it served their goals in domestic contests over national identities and domestic 
political orders. In her exemplary study of the ai case, Sinae Hyun calls this posture “indigenizing the Cold 
War.”9 At the same time, as Ang makes clear with reference to Philippine President Ferdinand Edralin 
Marcos and long-time ai Foreign Minister anat Khoman, some of these same Southeast Asians 
understood the inevitability of the region’s arrival at a modus vivendi with the PRC. And, of course, these 
various postures adopted by Southeast Asians were not mutually exclusive. But, even as American policy-
makers, perhaps Soviet policy-makers, and some Southeast Asians saw the region in the decades after 1945 or 
1949 through a Cold War lens, surely we historians need to encounter that perspective from a critical 
distance. We must decide how much weight to give to it in our work.  
Faced with that decision, one reads Southeast Asia’s Cold War with the clear sense that the rather trendy 
cultural turn may not represent as inappropriate, premature, or ill-considered a borrowing from the 
historiography of the Cold War in Europe as it may appear. Ang is correct in associating John R.W. Smail’s 
1961 article “On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Southeast Asia” with a “preoccupation . . . with 
the writing of ‘national history’” among historians of the region in that era (6). It is, however, worth recalling 
Smail’s contention that “social structure and culture” were the domains of historical autonomy in Southeast 
Asian societies subject to Western imperialism.10 is insight points to a certain logic for the adoption of the 
cultural turn in the study of the region’s experience of the era of the Cold War. As I have argued above, that 
era saw Southeast Asian states and societies consciously confronting the pressing need to work out identities 
and to structure socio-political orders. A focus on the social and cultural history of the era is, then, hardly 
misplaced.  
But there is a rub. At ﬁrst glance, the apparent logic for adoption of the cultural turn in ‘Cold War’ studies on 
Southeast Asia would suggest that participants in that turn are following in the footsteps of O. W. Wolters—
writing a history of Southeast Asians’ “localization” of forces and ideas from the wider world and their 
harnessing those forces and ideas to purposes of their own.11 But, like Ang, Wolters kept Southeast Asia at the 
center of the story. His interest in localization originated in his determination to treat Southeast Asian events 
                                                     
9 Sinae Hyun, “Indigenizing the Cold War: Nation-Building by the Border Patrol Police of ailand, 1945-
1980,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 2014. 
10 John R.W. Smail, “On the Possibility of an Autonomous History of Modern Southeast Asia,” Journal of 
Southeast Asian History 2:2 (July 1961): 72-102, 85. 
11 O.W. Wolters, History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives (Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1982), 55.  
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and to understand Southeast Asian mentalities, rather than in a concern with the manifestation in Southeast 
Asia of extra-regional developments. ough himself a prominent member of the Malayan Civil Service 
during the Emergency and a great admirer of Director of Operations and High Commissioner in Malaya 
General Sir Gerald Templer, Wolters is unlikely to have found scholarship centered on the so called ‘global 
Cold War’ worthy of his attention.12 He was a Southeast Asianist. 
Rather than the cultural turn in Cold War historiography, the truly ill-considered borrowing in the study of 
Southeast Asia from scholarship on Europe and the United States is perhaps the very idea that ‘the Cold War’ 
may serve usefully to deﬁne or characterize a period in the history of the region. One might argue that 
embracing that idea gives the region more relevance or interest to the scholars in North America or Europe 
who are most inﬂuential in ‘the Cold War ﬁeld.’ at rationale would, however, exemplify a variant of what 
Benedict Anderson branded, forty years ago, as one of two types of “failure of nerve” often observed among 
“area-specialists,” that of signing on to the latest fad in one’s discipline.13 e possibility that we are seeing, in 
the case of that ‘ﬁeld’ as it relates to Southeast Asia, such a failure among young scholars who ought to be in 
the most intellectually adventurous stages of their careers would be dispiriting.  
One might also argue that recourse to ‘the Cold War’ to characterize a period in the recent history of 
Southeast Asia represents a useful device for prodding specialists on diﬀerent countries in the region to talk to 
one another, a ‘convenient tag’ suggestive of transnational commonalities.14 But the study of Southeast Asia, 
as it developed from the years immediately following the Second World War, has always been a comparative 
ﬁeld. Ang’s book conforms to this tradition; hence both the appeal of the book’s perspective to the Southeast 
Asianist and its value as a reminder to younger scholars of earlier generations’ commitment to reading 
scholarship on as many parts of the region as time permitted.  
e device is not, then, necessary, and neither is its adoption cost-free. I have myself in the past succumbed to 
the temptation to apply the Cold War tag.15 I am therefore acutely aware of this cost. e era of the Cold 
War brought to Southeast Asia immense and lasting social and political distortions. is is undeniable. ose 
distortions resulted, in many familiar cases, from the conduct of local actors with either direct ties to 
Washington or strong commitments to Communism. But to make ‘the Cold War’ central to our study of 
their conduct, even if we use it as a lens to examine those actors’ localization of a ‘global’ conﬂict, is to risk 
introducing distortions into our work. At worst, it lets many of those actors, from across Southeast Asian 
                                                     
12 See Craig J. Reynolds, “e Professional Lives of O. W. Wolters,” 1-38 in O. W. Wolters, Early Southeast 
Asia: Selected Essays, Craig J. Reynolds ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2008). 
13 Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, “Studies of the ai State: e State of ai Studies,” 193-247 in Eliezer B. 
Ayal, ed., e Study of ailand: Analyses of Knowledge, Approaches, and Prospects in Anthropology, Art History, Economics, 
History, and Political Science (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1978), 232. 
14 I am grateful to Mitchell Tan for sharing his thoughts on this matter with me. 
15 For example, Michael Montesano, “Cold War ailand through the Eyes and Imagination of a Leading ai 
Cold Warrior,” lecture in series on “e Cold War in Southeast Asia,” delivered at the National Library, Singapore, 25 
February 2009, https://ari.nus.edu.sg/Event/Detail/843, downloaded 15 July 2018. 
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political spectra, oﬀ too easily.16 More generally, it distracts us from due focus on the worldviews, immediate 
priorities, and interests closest to home that were the most signiﬁcant sources of Southeast Asian actors’ 
conduct.  
But does restoring Southeast Asian worldviews, priorities, and interests to the study of the era of the Cold 
War in the region not lead us into the second type of failure of nerve about which Benedict Anderson sought 
to caution scholars of the region? at failure lay, he wrote, in  “deﬁantly crawling deeper into an ‘area-ist’ 
shell, insisting—in a defensive, ideological way—on the uniqueness and incomparability of the area of 
specialization, and engaging in the study of ever more narrowly deﬁned and esoteric topics.”17 Understanding 
the era of the Cold War as a chapter in Southeast Asia’s and its component parts’ interminable negotiation of 
its relationship with China certainly does not ﬁt that description. It links the history of the region during that 
era to something far larger than the Cold War, after all. e danger, if anything, lies in placing too much 
emphasis on Sino-Southeast Asian relations—in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres—and 
overstating, under the inﬂuence of developments of the present moment, their importance in the history of 
the region in the decades after 1945. But it is just the sort of danger with which historians are trained to 
grapple. 
As to the second plane on which Ang situates Southeast Asia during the era of Cold War, deﬁned by the need 
for the states and societies of the region to negotiate their own identities during that era, the introduction to 
Southeast Asia’s Cold War oﬀers an invaluable discussion of the overlapping histories of decolonization, 
“nation-building,” and the experience of the Cold War in the region (9-10). ose ﬁrst two frameworks will 
strike some young historians as relics of yesterday’s or the day-before-yesterday’s scholarship, with far less of 
the trendy appeal that the study of Cold War culture has come to have. But reﬂection suggests that those 
frameworks open the way to a more comprehensive, not to say sounder, understanding of the matters on 
which that study has focused. e exciting recent work of Kung Chien Wen on relations between the 
Philippines and the Republic of China on Taiwan in the three decades following the end of the Paciﬁc War is, 
with its attention to the question of sovereignty, a striking example.18 Likewise, despite its exceptionally 
strong ties to the Soviet Union at several times during the era of the Cold War, even Communist Vietnam 
oﬀers another such example. Peter Zinoman has brought fresh air to long-stale understandings of the Nhân 
văn–Giai phẩm aﬀair by lifting it out of the narrow context of strictly domestic Vietnamese politics and 
linking it to developments in the Communist world following the death of General Secretary of the 
                                                     
16 As Samson Lim, Siam’s New Detectives: Visualizing Crime and Conspiracy in Modern ailand (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2016), illustrates with striking eﬀectiveness, many of the social and political distortions that 
one might easily attribute to ‘the Cold War,’ that appear in fact to number among its deﬁning characteristics in the 
region, had in fact begun to manifest themselves rather earlier. His book thus represents yet another challenge to the 
utility of ‘the Cold War’ in periodization of recent Southeast Asian history. 
17 Anderson, “Studies of the ai State,” 232. 
18 Kung Chien Wen, “Nationalist China in the Postcolonial Philippines: Diasporic Anticommunism, Shared 
Sovereignty, and Ideological Chineseness, 1945-1970s,” doctoral dissertation, Department of History, Columbia 
University, 2018. Readers are also directed to Mitchell Tan, “Spiritual Fraternities: e Transnational Networks of Ngô 
Ðình Diệm’s Personalist Revolution and South Vietnam’s First Republic, 1955-1963,” unpublished manuscript, under 
consideration by e Journal of Vietnamese Studies. 
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Communist Party of the Soviet Union Joseph Stalin in 1953.19 But, as a consideration of international 
inﬂuences on cultural and political developments in early post-colonial Vietnam, his article on that aﬀair 
transcends in its importance that of a contribution to the study of the cultural Cold War in an arena far from 
its European theatre. 
In some parts of Southeast Asia, the passage of time and the emergence of a new, often superbly trained, 
generation of scholars have led to increased critical scrutiny of societies’ often conﬂictual quests for identity in 
the decades after 1945. is scrutiny has in turn heightened awareness of the impact on those quests of 
foreign, frequently American, scholars whose work is rather casually taken to reﬂect the imperatives 
Washington’s Cold War project.20   But a diﬀerent perspective suggests that this awareness has, in the context 
of the international fashion for Cold War history, given rise to the same overdetermined scholarship on the 
place of the Cold War in the region’s history that obtains outside Southeast Asia.21 Close engagement with 
Southeast Asia’s Cold War enriches that alternative perspective. Few of the arguments or contentions in this 
review will be news to the volume’s author, whose wide reading and research have enabled him to achieve 
exactly what “a general interpretive history” should achieve (1). In recognizing and delineating underlying 
themes in the history of Southeast Asia during the era of the Cold War, his latest book charts the region’s 
experience of that era without succumbing to the idea that Cold War itself deﬁned that experience.  
 
                                                     
19 Peter Zinoman, “Nhân Vãn–Giai Phâm and Vietnamese ‘Reform Communism’ in the 1950s: A Revisionist 
Interpretation,” e Journal of Cold War Studies 13:1 (Winter 2011): 60-100. In this connection, it is also worth calling 
attention to Edward Miller and Tuong Vu, “e Vietnam War as a Vietnamese War: Agency and Society in the Study of 
the Second Indochina War,” Journal of Vietnamese Studies 4:3 (October 2009): 1-16. 
20 I am indebted to anapas Dejpawuttikul for discussing this development with me. Benedict Anderson 
cautioned against the casual assumption noted here in the posthumous English-language version of his intellectual 
memoir; see Benedict R. O’G. Anderson, A Life Beyond Boundaries (London: Verso, 2016), 34-35 and 45. 
21 A pair of recent examples illustrate how perniciously that overdetermined understanding of the place of the 
Cold War in the history of the region has seeped from scholarship into more general understandings. “Banyan: Lots of 
elections, little democracy,” e Economist, 26 May 2018, 31, sloppily and confusingly cites a prominent American 
scholar of Southeast Asian politics associating the Cold War with a regional “collapse into authoritarianism.” Margaret 
Scott, “e Truth about the Killing Fields,” New York Review of Books, 28 June 2018, 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/06/28/truth-about-indonesia-killing-ﬁelds/, downloaded 9 June 2018) goes so 
far as to refer to the mass killings in Indonesia in the wake of the events of the night of 30 September-1 October 1965 in 
Djakarta and on its outskirts as a “cold war epic” and approvingly heralds the idea of a “global history of the cold war.” 
H-Diplo Roundtable-XX-39 
 
Author’s Response by Ang Cheng Guan, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 
et me begin by thanking Tom Maddux for facilitating this roundtable review. I wish also to thank all 
the reviewers for taking the time to read my book. In the course of my research on modern Southeast 
Asia, I have beneﬁtted from all their writings, including this set of reviews. For example, Kenton 
Clymer and Jürgen Haacke’s respective clariﬁcations of U.S.-Philippines relations during the Taft period and 
the conﬂict between the Burmese junta under the leadership of Ne Win and the Communist Party of Burma 
(CPB), all could potentially contribute to the depth and breadth of Southeast Asia’s Cold War. 
I deeply appreciate the kind words and comments of the four reviewers and am gratiﬁed that all concur on the 
book’s usefulness and contribution to future scholarship. I wrote this book with the intention of ﬁlling a 
lacuna in the historiography of the Cold War—the lack of a singular account of the Cold War in Southeast 
Asia. It is written with the non-specialists, particularly students interested in the international and political 
history of Southeast Asia during the Cold War years, in mind. I hope that those who teach such courses will 
ﬁnd the book handy and useful.  
All four reviewers have identiﬁed a number of shortcomings in the book, which I can generally agree with. As 
I was writing the sequel to Southeast Asia’s Cold War, I did a ‘self-critique’ of the book and my own 
conclusions in fact coincide with much of those of the reviewers.  
Clymer notes that the book “lacks a certain emotional appeal.” I agree, and on hindsight, I could have 
elucidated more on the human tragedies. Indeed, many lives were lost and communities destroyed. Some 
writers have pointed out that the war in Southeast Asia was more ‘hot’ than ‘cold.’ I should also have shifted 
the “ﬂimsy allegation” that ‘liberation theology’ was the result of a Soviet plot to the footnotes. Doing so 
would have improved the ﬂow of the narrative. 
I agree with Mattias Fibiger that I left out or paid little attention to “a whole range of more interesting 
stories”—state building, economic development and others. I agree all these other issues—“the domestic 
causes and consequences of the Cold War” are important. However, the Cold War framework may not 
necessarily be the best heuristic to explain these issues in every case. One of the most challenging problems in 
writing international history involves striking the right balance between the analysis of situations in terms of 
everything happening at one time (within the chosen perspective) and the pursuit of a narrative of the 
sequence of events in one place or institution over a period of time. I found it diﬃcult to weave the 
complexity of the domestic issues into the political history without essentializing them, and without making 
the narrative unwieldy. I look forward to reading Fibiger’s Ph.D. thesis and book. 
Jurgen Haacke felt that I was too brief in my account of the ‘economic dimension’ of the Cold War in the 
region. Again, this reﬂects not an oversight but a conscious decision to maintain a disciplined focus on 
political developments. But I agree that the economic dimension of the Cold War deserves to be examined 
and look forward to a complementary volume from a worthy scholar; I do not have the ‘bandwidth.’  
I enjoyed reading Michael Montesano’s wide-ranging review, which locates my book in the broader Southeast 
Asia historiography. I found his references to Benedict Anderson, John Smail, O.W Wolters, and his 
comments on the ‘cultural turn’ to be thought-provoking and refreshing. ere is something more involved 
than just keeping up with the ‘fashion’ of the ‘cultural turn’ or the term ‘Cold War.’ ere is one other 
important reason for the popularity of the cultural turn in the study of the region’s experience during the 
L 
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Cold War. at is, historians ﬁnd it diﬃcult, if not impossible, to write political history due to the lack 
indigenous archival sources. I adopted the term ‘Cold War’ as a shorthand in this book because it describes a 
period, which most scholars are familiar with. It was perhaps a missed opportunity not to propose a new term 
to represent the international history of the latter-twentieth century Southeast Asia. 
Finally, I wish to thank H-Diplo and all the reviewers again for taking time to comment on my book. I hope 
the book and this discussion will shape ‘future scholarship on the region’s international history’ in path-
breaking ways. 
